Posted by
Robert Davidson on May 12th, 2016 in
Papers |
Comments Off on CEO Materialism and Corporate Social Responsibility
Robert H Davidson
Pamplin School of Business, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Aiyesha Dey
Harvard Business School, Harvard University
Abbie J Smith
The University of Chicago Booth School of Business
Abstract
We study the role of individual CEOs in explaining corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores. We find that CEO fixed-effects explain 59% of the variation in CSR scores, whereas firm...
Posted by
Robert Davidson on May 12th, 2016 in
Papers |
Comments Off on Executives’ “Off-the-Job” Behavior, Corporate Culture, and Financial Reporting Risk
Robert H Davidson
McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University
Aiyesha Dey
Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota
Abbie J Smith
The University of Chicago Booth School of Business
Abstract
We examine how executives’ behavior outside the workplace, as measured by their ownership of luxury goods (low “frugality”) and prior legal infractions, is related to financial reporting risk. We predict...
Posted by
Robert Davidson on Oct 13th, 2015 in
Papers |
Comments Off on Bank CEO Materialism: Risk controls, culture, and tail risk
Robert M Bushman
Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
Robert H Davidson
Pamplin School of Business, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Aiyesha Dey
Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota
Abbie J Smith
The University of Chicago Booth School of Business
Abstract
We investigate how the prevalence of materialistic bank CEOs has evolved over time, and how...
Posted by
Robert Davidson on Jul 12th, 2014 in
Papers |
Comments Off on Income Statement Fraud and Balance Sheet Fraud: Different Manipulations, Different Incentives
Robert H Davidson
Pamplin School of Business, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
January 2017
Abstract
I find managers commit income statement fraud (fraud in which manipulations increase net income) when market price sensitivity to earnings news is high and their firms’ stock price is relatively more sensitive to idiosyncratic earnings performance. Managers commit balance sheet fraud (fraud in...
Posted by
Robert Davidson on Jul 12th, 2014 in
Papers |
Comments Off on Executives’ Legal Records and the Deterrent Effects of Corporate Governance
Robert H Davidson
Pamplin School of Business, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Aiyesha Dey
Harvard Business School
Abbie J Smith
The University of Chicago Booth School of Business
Abstract
We study whether the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms varies depending on the characteristics of the executives subject to these mechanisms – namely, their “psychological type”, as...